

1. Intro: Propositionalism

Forbes (2000; 2006)

(P) All content is propositional.

- Kinds of content
 linguistic, mental, perceptual, pictorial,...
- Kinds of propositionalism
 linguistic, mental, perceptual, pictorial,...
- + all-embracing (= Propositionalism)

(Q) All intensional contexts are parts of embedded clauses.

Quine (1956)

2. Pro Propositionalism

Quine (1956)

2.1 General motivation

- deductive uniformity
- ontological parsimony

2.2 Perceived objects

(1) *Duncan sees Macbeth.*

(2) $S(d,m)$

(3) *Macbeth sees a dagger.*

(4) $(\exists y) [D(y) \ \& \ S(m,y)]$

Meinong (1904): mental images

(5) $V(m) \models (\exists y) D(y)$

(6) $\overline{V}_m (\exists y) D(y)$

Hintikka (1969)

(7) $V_i(m) = \{j \mid S_i(m,j)\} \subseteq \{j \mid (\exists y) D_j(y)\} = \llbracket \textit{There is a dagger} \rrbracket$

(8) $(\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow (\exists y) D_j(y)]$

unspecificity/immaterialit = scopal dependence

(9) $S^+_i(m, \lambda j. (\exists y) D_j(y))$

= (8)

(10) $S^+ = \lambda i. \lambda p. \lambda x. (\forall j) [S_i(x,j) \rightarrow p(j)]$

propositional attitude

(11) $(\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow (\exists y) [D_j(y) \ \& \ (\exists z) z = y]]$

= (8)

(12) $(\exists y) [D_i(y) \ \& \ (\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow (\exists z) z = y]]$

specific reading

(13) $(\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow (\exists z) z = d]$

Problems:

- Indiscernability (*de re* problem)

Kaplan (1968); Lewis (1981)

Perceptual content cannot distinguish between qualitatively identical copies.

(14) $(\exists R) [K(R) \ \& \ R_i(m,d) \ \& \ (\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow \ \& \ (\exists z) R_j(m,d)]]$

instead of (13); $K(R)$: ' R is a Kaplanian relation'

(15) $(\exists y) [D_i(y) \ \& \ (\exists R) [K(R) \ \& \ R_i(m,y) \ \& \ (\forall j) [S_i(m,j) \rightarrow [D_j(y) \ \& \ (\exists z) R_j(m,z)]]]]$

for (8)

- Perspective (*de se* problem)

Lewis (1979)

Seeing the obverse of a coin does not imply seeing its reverse.

necessary coexistence

(16) $(\forall j) (\forall \sigma) [S_i(m, \langle j, \sigma \rangle) \rightarrow (\exists y) [D_j(y) \ \& \ L_j(\sigma, y)]]$ instead of (8) – σ : subject; L: look-at

(17) $S^\#_i(m, \lambda j. \lambda \sigma. (\exists y) [D_j(y) \ \& \ L_j(\sigma, y)])$

centered proposition (a.k.a. property)

(18) $S^\# = \lambda i. \lambda Q. \lambda x. (\forall j) (\forall \sigma) [S_i(x, \langle j, \sigma \rangle) \rightarrow Q_j(\sigma)]$

subjective/perspectival attitude

2.3 Missing objects

(19) *A screw is missing.*

(20) $(\exists y) [S_i(y) \& M_i(y)]$

(21) $(\exists y) [S_i(y) \& M_i(y,x)]$

(22) *Peter is missing.*

(23) $[\neg I_i(p,x) \& (\forall j>_x i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow I_j(p,x)]]$ =

where $j>_x i \Rightarrow (\forall y) [I_i(y,x) \rightarrow I_j(y,x)]$

(24) $(\forall j >_x i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow [I_j(p,x) \& \neg I_i(p,x)]]$

... provided that $(\exists j>i) C_j(x)$

(25) $(\forall j>i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow (\exists y) [S_j(y) \& I_j(y,x) \& \neg I_i(y,x)]]$

(subscript omitted)

(26) $(\exists y) [S_i(y) \& (\forall j>i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow [I_j(y,x) \& \neg I_i(y,x)]]]$

specific reading

(27) *Every (single) screw is missing.*

Thanks to Cécile Meier (p.c.)

(28) $(\forall j>i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow (\forall y) [[S_j(y) \& I_j(y,x)] \rightarrow \neg I_i(y,x)]]]$

(29) *Two screws are missing.*

(30) $(\forall j>i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow (\exists Y) [\bar{Y} = 2 \& (\forall y \in Y) [S_j(y) \& I_j(y,x) \& \neg I_i(y,x)]]]$

= $(\forall j>i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow (\exists Y) [\bar{Y} = 2 \& [\lambda y. S_j(y) \& I_j(y,x) \& \neg I_i(y,x)]^*(Y)]]$ Link's (1983) *

3. Contra Propositionalism

3.1 Critical voices

(31) $[[Hesperus \text{ is a planet}]] \neq [[Phosphorus \text{ is a planet}]]$

Frege (1892)

$\Rightarrow [[Hesperus]] \neq [[Phosphorus]]$

non-propositional

(32) *The thirsty man wants beer.*

Meinong (1904): intentional object

(33) *Jones worships a Greek goddess.*

R. Montague (1969) – thanking Hans Kamp

(34) *Lex Luthor fears Superman (but not Clark Kent).*

Forbes (2000)

(35) *Horatio believes that things Horatio doesn't believe in exist.*

Szabó (2003): coherent belief

(36) *John likes chocolate.*

... (partly) explains why ...

John wants to have chocolate.

M. Montague (2007)

3.2 Pictures and perspectives

(37) *Vincent paints a temple.*

Preliminaries

- Distinguish (at least) four readings one of which is *representational*.

Zimmermann (2006b); Piñón (2009)

- Distinguish use, reference, bare visual content, and communicated content of pictures.

Goodman (1969)

- Assume that representational reading characterises pictorial content.

- Take perspective into account.

cf. (16)–(18)

(38) $(\exists y) [CBP_i(v,y) \& (\forall j) (\forall \sigma) [PPC_i(y, \langle j, \sigma \rangle) \rightarrow (\exists y) [T_j(y) \& L_j(\sigma, y)]]]$

CBP: create by painting ; PPC: perspectival pictorial content

Problems:

- Pictorial content may exclude spectator.
- Perspective does not always distinguish necessarily coexisting objects.

Solutions?

- Introduce abstract perspectives

... and previous drink coordinate

- Refine propositional paraphrases

The extent to which faith in the existence of an appropriate paraphrase outruns the

believer's ability to give such a paraphrase is often quite striking.

Parsons (1980: 36)

3.3 Objects missing

(39) *Most screws are missing.*

(40) $(\forall j > i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow [[S_j(y) \ \& \ I_j(y,x)] \langle \text{MOST } y \rangle \neg I_i(y,x)]]]$

(41) $[\lambda x.] \lambda Q. (\forall j > i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow [Q_j \uparrow [\lambda y. I_j(y,x)] (\lambda y. \neg I_i(y,x))]]]$

missing'

☞ compositionality problem

Johnsen (1987)

Solutions?

ad hoc type adaption:

(42a) $\lambda x. \lambda R. (\forall j > i) [C_j(x) \rightarrow [R_j(x)(\lambda y. \neg I_j(y,x))]]]$

R of type $s(e((et)t))$

(b) $\lambda x. \lambda Q. [[S_i(y) \ \& \ I_i(y,x)] \langle \text{MOST } y \rangle Q(y)]$

most⁺ screws

(c) $\lambda P. \lambda x. \lambda Q. [[P(y) \ \& \ I_i(y,x)] \langle D \ y \rangle Q(y)]$

D^+ (where D is of type $(et)((et)t)$)

non-propositionalist:

- Counting concepts

Condoravdi *et al.* (2001); Zimmermann (2006a)

- Undercover Quantification

Aloni (2001); Schwager (to appear)

(43) $\#(\lambda Y. [S^+_i(Y) \ \& \ \text{missing}'(Y, x)]) > \#(\lambda Y. [S^+_i(Y) \ \& \ \neg \text{missing}'(Y, x)])$

$\equiv \#(\lambda Y. [S^+_i(Y) \ \& \ \text{missing}'(Y, x)]) > \#(\lambda y. [S_i(y) \ \& \ I_i(y, x)])$

... with Y ranging over suitable intensional entities

4. Outro: Threat of Trivialiasation

Martin Stokhof (p.c.)

- (Q) vs. Propositionalism

- Framework dependence

- Russellian propositionalism

Kaplan (1975)

- Properties and cardinality arguments

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